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WHO'S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD WORKS
MADE FOR HIRE DOCTRINE?-NOT
THE SUPREME COURT
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act ("1976 Act"),'
United States courts have been compelled to walk a tightrope divid-
ing employees and independent contractors in works made for hire
cases.2 A growing debate has ensued regarding the definition of
"employee" within the confines of the 1976 Act. Courts have been
looking for guidance on this issue and the Supreme Court has been
silent - until recently.
In June, 1989, the Supreme Court broke its silence in Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid' ("CCNV") by holding that a
commissioned free-lance author retains copyright ownership over
his creation if he is not an employee in the conventional sense.4
Thus, in the absence of a specific agreement assigning the copyright
to the hiring party, the artist or other independent producer will re-
tain the ownership of their work product. This, however, may be
contrary to the expectations of the contracting party.
This casenote discusses the evolution of the works made for hire
doctrine. Part I examines sections 101(1) and 101(2) of the 1976
Act and discusses the various tests used by courts to define "em-
ployee" within the 1976 Act. Part II discusses Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence v. Reid.' Part III discusses the effects of CCNV
on works made for hire and the entertainment industry by analyzing
several cases that might have been decided differently had they
been tried under the recent Supreme Court analysis. Part IV exam-
ines the future of the works made for hire doctrine. Furthermore,
part IV discusses post-CCNV problems with the works made for hire
doctrine and evaluates a new Senate bill proposing amendments to
the 1976 Act. This casenote concludes that only by amending the
1976 Act will its ambiguity be laid to rest once and for all.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See infra note 23 (defining author of work made
for hire).
2. See infra notes 28-50 and accompanying text (discussing various tests used
by the courts to define copyright ownership).
3. 490 U.S. 732 (1989).
4. Id. at 738. "In the past, when Congress has used the term 'employee' with-
out defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conven-
tional master-servant relationship as understood by common law agency doctrine."
Id.
5. 490 U.S. 732 (1989).
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I. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND THE WORK MADE
FOR HIRE PROVISION
A. Historical Background of the 1909 Copyright Act
The importance of copyright law was initially recognized in the
United States by the framers of the Constitution as they gave Con-
gress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The
first Copyright law was enacted shortly thereafter in 1790.1 Con-
gress subsequently enacted comprehensive revisions in 1831, 1870
and 1909.' The Copyright Act of 1909 (hereinafter "1909 Act") 9
remained in effect until Congress enacted the 1976 Act.' 0
The 1909 Act, however, did not explicitly deal with works made
for hire. 1 1 The 1909 Act did not define a work made for hire, nor
did it discuss the employment relationship. It merely stated that "the
word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of a work made
for hire."' 2
Thus, due to the 1909 Act's failure to clearly define a work made
for hire, the federal courts developed several tests to interpret its
meaning. One such test was the "instance and expense" analysis
which was introduced in Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler,1
3
where the Ninth Circuit held that the copyright owner is the person
at whose instance and expense the work is done.' 4 Similarly, in Pic-
6. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659, 5660 (hereinafter "1976 House Report").
8. Id.
9. 17 U.S.C. (1909) (amended 1977).
10. Id. The 1909 Act was codified and enacted into positive law, Title 17 of the
United States Code entitled "Copyrights," in 1947. Since Title 17 "made no sub-
stantial changes in the provisions of the 1909 Act and its amendments except to
omit those provisions that had become obsolete," 17 U.S.C.A. at VIII (West 1977).
"It]he law as it stood prior to the 1976 enactment is generally referred to as the
'Copyright Act of 1909'." 18 AM. JuR. 2d Copyright and Literary Property, § 1, n.
13 (1985).
11. 1976 House Report, supra note 7, at 5660. Works for hire were not a fore
seeable concern at the time the 1909 Act was enacted. Id. "Motion pictures and
sound recordings had just made their appearance in 1909, and radio and televi
sion were still in the early stages of their development." Id. "The technical ad
vances have generated new industries and new methods for the reproduction and
dissemination of copyrighted works, and the business relations between authors
and users have evolved new patterns." Id.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909).
13. 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965).
14. Id. at 300. The court stated that:
[w]hen one person engages another, whether as employee or as an in-
dependent contractor, to produce a work of an artistic nature, that in the
absence of an express contractual reservation of the copyright in the artist,
Works Made For Hire Doctrine
ture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.,' 5 the Second Circuit stated "that the
motivating factor in producing the work was the employer who in-
duced the creation." 1 6
Other factors used by the courts to interpret the 1909 Copyright
Act were the manner in which the work was done, 7 and the nature
or existence of the compensation paid to the creator of the work.'"
B. 1976 Copyright Act and the Interpretations of the
Works Made for Hire Doctrine
In 1976, advances in technology compelled Congress to repeal
the 1909 Act by Title 17 of the United States Code.' 9 Section
201(a) of the 1976 Act provides that an author automatically owns
the copyright to his creation. 20 The 1976 Act, however, provides an
exception for works made for hire under Section 201(b) to protect
the interests of organizations that commission freelance creators.
2
'
the presumption arises that the mutual intent of the parties is that the title to
the copyright shall be in the person at whose instance and expense the
work is done.
Id.
15. 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972). Appel-
lant was denied copyright interest in her adaptation of the song "Who's Afraid of
the Big Bad Wolf?" for the Walt Disney Productions, Inc. animated cartoon "The
Three Little Pigs."
16. Id. at 1216 (quoting Note, Renewal of Copyright - Section 23 of the Copy-
right Act of 1909 [now section 24], 44 CoLum. L. Rsv. 712, 716 (1944)).
17. See Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970).
18. See Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) (holding that no employment relationship
existed between the parties because the so-called "employee" received no com-
pensation for his work).
19. Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1977).
"During the past half century a wide range of new techniques for capturing and
communicating printed matter, visual images, and recorded sounds have come into
use, and the increasing use of information storage and retrieval devices, communi-
cations satellites, and laser technology promises even greater changes in the near
future." 1976 House Report, supra note 7, at 5660.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976). Section 201(a) reads as follows:
"S.c'ON 201: Ownership of Copyright
(a) Initial Ownership - Copyright in a work protected under this title
vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint
work are co-owners of copyright in the work."
Id.
21. 17 U.S.C. Section 201(b) (1976). Section 201(b) reads as follows:
(b) Works Made for Hire - In the case of a work made for hire, the em-
ployer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright.
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Section 201(b) states that the organization that commissions the
work becomes the author and receives the author's copyright when
the creation is a work made for hire.2 2 Sections 101(1) and 101(2)
describe the two ways that a freelance creation may be classified as
a work made for hire.23
Under section 101(2) a work is made for hire if it falls within one
of nine enumerated categories and also if the parties expressly
agree in a written agreement that the work is to be for hire.24 Sec-
tion 101 (1) offers a mutually exclusive way that a work can be made
for hire. This occurs when the work is prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her "employment."125 Unfortunately, this
has not assisted independent contractors because Congress failed to
explicitly define "'employer", "employee" or "scope of
employment." 26
On one side of the debate, writers, composers and other artists
argue that if a creative work is made for hire then they will not re-
ceive sufficient compensation for their creativity. Publishers, motion
picture producers and other employers, alternatively argue that
there are substantial risks involved that are assumed by the em-
ployer, and that the employees are compensated for exactly what
they are asked to provide. 7 As a result of this controversy, courts
have established three tests to, interpret the meaning of "em-
ployee."2 The three tests are the literal approach, the conservative
approach, and the "Aldon" actual control approach.
22. Id. See supra note 21 (setting forth text of Section 201(b)).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Section 101 defines a work for hire as follows:
SECTIoN 101: A 'work made for hire' is:
1. a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
2. a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as (1) a contribu-
tion to a collective work, as part of (2) a motion picture or other audiovi-
sual work, (3) as a translation, (4) as a supplementary work, (5) as a
compilation, (6) as an instructional text, (7) a test, (8) answer material for a
test (9) or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
Id.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). See supra note 23 (setting forth text of section 101(2)).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1). See supra note 23 (setting forth text of section 101(1)).
26. Congress recognized the ambiguity yet did nothing about it. See 1976
House Report, supra note 7, at 5737. "The basic problem is how to draw a statutory
line between those works written on special order or commission that should be
considered as 'works made for hire' and those that should not." Id.
27. See Kling, The Work Made for Hire Doctrine Under the Copyright Act of
1976: Employees, Independent Contractors and the Actual Control Test, 22 IND. L.
REv. 619, 622 (1988).
28. Id. at 629-636; See Doyle, The Work Made for Hire Doctrine: Incentive and
Concern - Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 62 Tna. L. REv. 377,
386-393 (1989).
Works Made For Hire Doctrine
1. The Literal Approach
This approach focuses on the plain meaning of the language in
the work made for hire doctrine of the 1976 Act.29 The literal ap-
proach defines a work made for hire as a work prepared by an em-
ployee within the scope of his or her employment,3 0 or a work by an
independent contractor falling within the nine categories of section
101(2) of the 1976 Copyright Act3 l as long as it is accompanied by
a written agreement between the parties stating this is a work made
for hire.32 Courts which utilize this interpretation treat subsections
101(1) and 101(2) of the 1976 Act as mutually exclusive. 3
The Fifth Circuit used the literal approach in Easter Sea] Society
v. Playboy Enterprises.3 4 In Easter Seal Society, a musician on be-
half of the Easter Seal Society entered a contract with a local televi-
sion station to film a mock Mardi Gras Parade and jam session.
While the entertainer made several suggestions to the television
crew, studio personnel were primarily responsible for all technical
decisions. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit held that the videotape
was not a work made for hire and the musician was considered an
employee rather than an independent contractor.35
The Fifth Circuit defined employee using traditional agency law
factors.3 6 If it is decided, however, that the person is an independ-
ent contractor it is not a work made for hire unless it fits within one
of the nine specified categories of the 1976 Act and is expressly
29. See supra note 23 (setting forth language of works made for hire doctrine).
30. 17 U.S.C. 101(1). See supra note 23 (setting forth text of § 101(1)).
31. See Kling, supra note 27, at 629.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). See Doyle, supra note 28, at 629; see also supra note
23 (setting forth text of § 101(2)).
33. Kling, supra note 27, at 629; Mr. Kling states that the two subsections of the
act are mutually exclusive. Id. "In other words, under the literal interpretation, the
first subsection includes only regular salaried employees. Subsection (2) of the def-
inition enumerates the only categories of independent contractors (assumed to be
anyone who is not a regular salaried employee) which may be subject to the work
for hire doctrine." Id. See, e.g., Childers v High Society Magazine, Inc., 557 F.
Supp. 978, aff'd on rehearing, 561 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
34. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v.
Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
1280 (1988).
35. Id. "WYES did not simply set up one camera on a tripod, turn it on and sit
down to watch. Instead, it worked cooperatively and dynamically with the perform-
ers to create the field tapes. This work was a work of authorship." Id. at 337.
36. Id. at 334-37. In the Opinion, Judge Gee wrote that:
[A]dopting an agency-law definition of copyright "employment" creates a
certain symmetry: a buyer is a statutory "author" if and only if he is re-
sponsible for the negligent acts of the seller. For example, a buyer will
only be the "author" of a writing if he would be liable under respondent
superior in a defamation action based on that writing. Id. at 335. See
infra note 71 (setting forth eleven factors determining an employee
relationship).
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commissioned as such. s7
2. The Conservative Approach
The conservative approach is similar to the "instance and expense
test" which courts use regularly in their interpretation of the 1909
Act.38 The conservative approach examines whether the work was
created at the instance and expense of the buyer. If so, and the
buyer has exercised supervision over the creator, then the creator
becomes an "employee" under section 101(1) of the 1976 Act.3 9
The enumerated categories in 10 1(2) are therefore, only referring to
commissioned works which are not works for hire unless the parties
expressly agree to this in a signed instrument.
One notable flaw with this approach is that it treats the 1976 Act
just like its predecessor in that it infers that Congress had no chance
in mind when it enacted the 1976 Act.40 As a result, few courts
have employed this approach.41
3. The Aldon "Actual Control" Compromise
The Aldon "Actual Control Test ("Aldon Test"), also supported
by the Second Circuit view draws a compromise between the literal
and the conservative views.4 2 In order to find an employer/em-
ployee relationship the Aldon Test requires the employer to have
control over the creative process, but more importantly actual par-
ticipation in the project. 43
This test was set forth by the Second Circuit in Aldon Accessories
Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.4 4 In Aldon, plaintiff (Aldon) and defendant
(Spiegel) each manufactured a line of brass and porcelain statuettes
in the form of mythical creatures and at issue in the case was the
37. The Supreme Court followed similar reasoning in deciding Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 732 (1989). See infra notes 51-88 and
accompanying text (discussing the CCNV decision).
38. See supra notes 13-16, and accompanying text (discussing the instance and
expense test).
39. 17 U.S.C. 101(1) (1977).
40. Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d at 331. "The problem with the 'conservative'
interpretation is that we cannot avoid the impression that Congress meant somehow
to tighten up the 'work for hire' doctrine under the 1976 Act, although it failed to
make clear where and how this tightening is to take place." Id.
41. Id.; See, e.g., Peregrine v. Lauren Corporation, 601 F.Supp. 828, 829 (D.
Colo. 1985); Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
42. See Goldberg and Bernstein, Copyright Law: The Work for Hire Conflict,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1988, at 3, col. 5.
43. Id. "The theoretical right to control, present in most circumstances where
one party is paying another, is no longer enough. We now require actual... con-
trol of the creative process by the buyer." Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d at 332.
44. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
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lawful ownership of the statuettes.45 Spiegel claimed that Aldon did
not own the statuettes because Aldon did not exercise actual control
over their manufacture since he had two overseas trading firms man-
ufacture the statuettes. 46 Aldon, however, worked very closely with
the artists who made the models.47 Subsequent to their completion,
Aldon also received copyright registration certificates for the work
declaring him as the author and the work as performed for hire.48
The Second Circuit subsequently deemed Aldon the owner of the
statuettes since he exercised actual control over the manufacture of
the statuettes.49
The Second Circuit reaffirmed that the 1976 Act does not define
employee, and therefore, stated that even under the first part of the
1976 Act, an independent contractor can be considered an em-
ployee if the contractor is so controlled and supervised in the crea-
tion of the particular work by the employing party that an employer/
employee relationship exists.50
Thus, the actual control requirement differs from the literal inter-
pretation because it is broader as it encompasses more situations.
Here the test can extend to independent contractors, while the lit-
eral approach is restricted to employees in the traditional sense.5 1
The Aldon test likewise differs from the conservative approach be-
cause the conservative approach bases ownership solely on instance
and expense whereas the Aldon test emphasizes participation as
well as control.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANSWER TO THE WORKS
MADE FOR HIRE DILEMMA: COMMUNITY FOR
CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE v. REID
The differences among the tests used by federal courts all center
on Congress' failure to define "employment" or "scope of employ-
ment," or "employee." For years, the Supreme Court was silent on
this issue, until it decided Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
45. See id. at 549.
46. See id. at 550-51.
47. Id. at 553. "While he did not physically wield the sketching pen and sculpt-
ing tools, he stood over the artists and artisans at critical stages of the process,
telling them exactly what to do. He was, in a very real sense, the artistic creator."
Id.
48. Id. at 550.
49. See id. at 553.
50. Id. at 553.
51. See Kling, supra note 27, at 633. In contrast to the conservative interpreta-
tion, under which "right to control is sufficient to find an employer/employee rela-
tionship, this view requires at least actual supervision by the employing party." Id.
See also O'Meara, Works Made for Hire Under The Copyright Act of 1976 - Two
Interpretations, 15 CRziowroN L. Rzv. 523 (1981-82) (discussing the two views).
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Reid.5 2
In the fall of 1985, Community for Creative Non-Violence, a non-
profit organization based in Washington D.C. and dedicated to elim-
inating homelessness, entered into an oral agreement with James
Earl Reid, a sculptor, to create a statue characteristic of homeless-
ness in America.- 3 At this point of the agreement, no mention was
made of copyright ownership.
The statue was to be displayed in the upcoming Christmas Pag-
eant in Washington. 4 The statue took the form of a modern nativity
scene, however, in lieu of the traditional Holy Family, the scene pic-
tured a homeless couple huddled on the street with their child. s
Throughout the project, Community for Creative Non-Violence
and Reid worked very closely together and conferred regularly on
materials used, and time schedules for the completion of the pro-
ject.16 Reid worked exclusively on the statue, assisted at various
times by several other people who were paid with funds provided in
installments by CCNV.s 7 CCNV also agreed to create the pedestal
and base for the statue and visited Reid to check on the progress of
the creation."
On December 24, 1985, the completed statue was delivered, and
Reid received the final installment of his compensation." After
Christmas, the statue was returned to Reid's workshop for minor re-
pairs. CCNV then informed Reid that they planned to take the
statue on a tour across the nation in an effort to raise money for the
homeless. Reid stated that the statue could not withstand such a trip
and refused to return it to CCNV.6 ° Reid then filed for copyright
registration in his own name and promised to take the sculpture on a
more modest tour than that proposed by CCNV, and CCNV subse-
52. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
53. See id. at 733.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 733-34. CCNV and Reid together visited homeless families on the
streets of Washington, D.C., and studied their habits and actions so as to acquire a
personal feel for the statue. They also closely conferred on whether to have the
statue made of bronze, but this was not within CCNV's budget and a substitute was
used. On another occasion, Reid wanted to sculpt a shopping bag for the family's
belongings, but instead CCNV insisted on a shopping cart. See id.
57. See id. at 733.
58. Id. Reid also wanted to cast the statue in bronze at a cost of $100,000. It
also would have taken six to eight additional weeks to complete but CCNV rejected
this idea because of limited funds and time. Id. The parties agreed on an inexpen-
sive substitute material called "Design Cast 62." The total cost of the statute was
agreed not to exceed $15,000 plus the cost of Reid's services. Id. at 733-34.
59. See id. at 735. The statue was delivered twelve days after the agreed upon
date. Id.
60. Id. Reid stated that the statue would not survive an extended trip because
the cheaper material with which it was made might crack. Id.
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quently filed a competing copyright registration.6 1
After the district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering
the return of the sculpture, the district court declared that the statue
was a "work made for hire" under section 101 of the 1976 Act 6 2
and that CCNV was exclusive owner of the copyright in the sculp-
ture because "CCNV was the motivating force in the statue's pro-
duction, .. . and directed enough of Reid's efforts to assure that, in
the end, he had produced what they, not he wanted." 63 In essence,
the district court applied the "conservative interpretation"6 4 to de-
fine the employment relationship.
The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded the district
court's decision and based its analysis on the "literal interpreta-
tion" 65 of the employment relationship. The Fifth Circuit read sec-
tion 101 of the 1976 Act as creating "a simple dichotomy in fact
between employees and independent contractors."166 They stated
that under agency law, Reid was an independent contractor, there-
fore, the work was not prepared by an "employee," under section
101(1), nor did it fit under one of the categories enumerated in
101(2) of the 1976 Act.6 7
On June 5, 1989, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
D.C. Circuit's decision.68
A. Supreme Court Decided Under Common
Law Agency Principles
The Supreme Court recognized the fact that the 1976 Act failed
to define the terms "employee" and "scope of employment." Justice
Marshall stated while delivering the court's opinion, however, that
"where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the estab-
lished meaning of these terms."-69 Therefore, the Supreme Court de-
cided this case under the common law of agency, a practice utilized
61. Id.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
63. 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1456 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd 846 F.2d 1485, cert. granted
488 U.S. 940 (1988).
64. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the conservative
interpretation).
65. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (discussing "literal interpre-
tation.") See also Easter Seal Society v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988) (video presentation where the court
also applied the literal interpretation). Thus, the Fifth Circuit followed its own pre-
cedent in Easter Seal Society. Id.
66. 815 F.2d at 329; CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1492.
67. 846 F.2d at 1494.
68. See CCNV, 490 U.S. 730.
69. Id. at 736, quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).
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to show that federal statutes have uniform nationwide application.70
According to the Supreme Court decision, several factors must be
examined to determine whether the commissioned person is an em-
ployee or an independent contractor including:
the duration of the relationship between the parties;7 1 whether the
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired
party,7 2 the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and
70. Id. at 737. Justice Marshall wrote:
[tihis practice reflects the fact that "federal statutes are generally intended
to have uniform nationwide application." Establishment of a federal rule
of agency, rather than reliance on state agency law, is particularly appro-
priate here given the Act's express objective of creating national uniform
copyright law by broadly pre-empting state statutory and common law
copyright regulation.
Id. (cite ommitted) (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S.-, -, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1605 (1989)).
71. See, e.g., Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947); See REsTATz-
mmr (szcorN) OF Aogc, § 220(2) (1957). The Second Restatement of Agency lists
eleven factors to be considered when determining the nature of an employee
relationship:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance
of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an in-
dependent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exer-
cise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupa-
tion or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by
a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentali-
ties, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business:
REsTATEmNT (Szcoro) oF Aomicy § 220 (1958).
72. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989). The
Ninth Circuit in Dumas balanced eight factors to determine whether a work is for
hire. They include (1) where the artist conducted his work; (2) whether the buyer
was in the regular business of creating similar works; (3) whether the artist works
for several buyers at a time or exclusively; (4) whether buyer has the authority to
assign additional projects to the artist; (5) the tax consequences stemming from the
parties' relationship; (6) the channels through which the buyer hired the artist; (7)
the method of compensation; (8) the benefits conveyed to the artist, Id.
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how long to work;7 3 the method of payment;74 the hired party's
role in hiring and paying assistants;7 5 whether the work is part of
the regular business of the hiring party;76 whether the hiring party
is in business; 77 the provision of employee benefits;78 and the tax
treatment of the hired party.79
Incorporating these factors, the Court reasoned that Reid was
clearly an independent contractor. Granted, CCNV was actively in-
volved in the shaping of the project, however, Reid was a sculptor
and the work was part of his regular business. He supplied his own
tools, and worked in his Own studio in Baltimore. Thus, daily super-
vision by CCNV in Washington was virtually impossible.80 Further-
more, Reid was retained exclusively for two months for this project,
and CCNV had no right to assign other projects to Reid, or dictate to
him his working hours. Finally, Reid was not on CCNV's payroll,
nor was he eligible for any benefits from them. Therefore, absent
any agreement to the contrary, the Court held that the statue was not
a work made for hire within the confines of the statute.8"
B. Right to Control is Not Dispositive of an Employer/
Employee Relationship
The Court recognized that section 101 of the 1976 Act creates
two distinct ways in which a work can be deemed for hire.8 2 The
first approach deals with works prepared by employees, while the
second focuses on specially commissioned works falling within one
of the nine enumerated categories83 and are subject to a written
agreement.
8 4
The Court rejected the traditional "right to control test" because it
"ignores this dichotomy by transforming into a work for hire, under
section 101 (1) any 'specially ordered or commissioned' work that is
73. See, e.g., Short v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 729 F.2d
567, 572 (8th Cir. 1984). The Eighth Circuit in Short listed several factors that
must be balanced in order to decide whether a worker is an employee or an in-
dependent contractor. The court recognized, however, that the most important fac-
tor is the right of control over the artist. Id.
74. See, e.g., Dumas at 1105.
75. See, e.g., Short at 574.
76. See, e.g., Dumas at 1105; see also, RESTATEMENT (SEcom) or AovNcv,
§ 220(2)(h) (1957).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SEcom) OF AoENcy § 220(2)(j).
78. See, e.g., Short at 574.
79. See, e.g., Dumas at 1105. See also CCNV, 109 S.Ct. at 2178-79; RESTATE-
MErT (SEcoND) OF AoENcy § 220(2), supra note 70, which sets forth a non-exhaustive
list of factors relevant to determining whether a hired party is an employee.
80. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 745.
81. Id. at 745-46.
82. Id. at 739.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). See supra note 23 (setting forth text of § 101(2)).
84. Id.
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subject to the supervision and control of the hiring party." 8"
The Court likewise rejected the Aldon Actual Control Test.86 Ac-
cording to the Court, under the actual control test, a work for hire
could only arise under section 101(2) where a party commissions,
but does not actually control, a product that falls into one of the nine
categories set forth in section 101(2) of the 1976 Act.8 7
Thus, Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, basically ac-
cepted the literal interpretation and "came down squarely on the
side of the Fifth Circuit, putting itself directly at odds with the Sec-
ond and Seventh Circuits."8'Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, however,
the Supreme Court's decision did not address section 101(2) of the
1976 Act.8 9
85. CCNV, 109 S.Ct. at 2173.
86. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Aldon Test).
87. See CCNV, 109 S.Ct. at 2174; see also, Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d at
334. "MThere is no way to milk the 'actual control' test of Aldon Accessories from
the language of the statute." CCNV, 109 S.Ct. at 2174, quoting Easter Seal Soci-
ety, 815 F.2d at 334. "We therefore conclude that the language and structure of
section 101 of the Act do not support either the right to control the product or the
actual control approaches." Id.
88. Goldberg and Bernstein, Copyright Law: The Work For Hire Conflict,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1988, at 3, col. 7. The Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Society, like-
wise utilized common law agency principles to determine a definition of "em-
ployee" as did the Supreme Court in CCNV. Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d at 334.
In Easter Seal, however, the court also stated that the second part of the definition
must be specifically examined, while the Supreme Court was silent on this issue. Id.
The Supreme Court concluded that alternative tests used by lower courts are
invalid and we must stick to the general principles of agency law. See CCNV, 109
S.Ct. at 2173. The court further stated that the undefined statutory terms find con-
siderable support in the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act which almost
completely revised existing copyright law, and was the product of two decades of
negotiation by the Copyright Office and Congress. Id. at 2174. Two things, how-
ever, remained constant. First of all, works by employees and commissioned works
by independent contractors were always viewed as separate entities. Secondly, "in
using the term 'employee,' the parties and Congress meant to refer to a hired party
in a conventional employment relationship. These factors militate in favor of the
reading we have found appropriate." Id.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). Once again, under that section, a work is "made for
hire" when the parties sign a written agreement explicitly recognizing that the work
is, in fact, "made for hire" and when the commissioned work fits into one of the nine
enumerated categories. Id. If a commissioned project does not fit into any one of
the nine categories of section 101(2), the commissioning party can still obtain own-
ership of the copyright by means of an assignment. See Patton, AN AuTHoR's GUIDE
To CopvmoHr LAw, 70-71 (1980). See also Samuels, PATtr, TRDnumK um Copy-
mowr LAws, 182-88 (1985) for a discussion on duration of copyright. The freelance
creator must sign a written agreement explicitly assigning to the commissioning
party the ownership of his copyright in the work. If the commissioning party wants
the power to renew its assigned copyright, an agreement must explicitly provide for
an assignment of the right to renew as well. Id.
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III: RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE - THE EFFECT
OF COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-
VIOLENCE v. REID ON THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
As a result of CCNV, businesses that commission creative works,
including advertising agencies, film and record companies, com-
puter software developers, and the like will often be deprived of the
benefits of copyright ownership unless the issue is explicitly ad-
dressed by contract. Their payments to freelance creators will, in
effect, cover only a one-time use vesting all future copyright inter-
ests in the creator.
Although the recent Supreme Court decision dealt with a sculp-
tor, it effects all "artists." This section will retrospectively examine
several cases with recurring issues in the field of entertainment that
might have been decided differently under the Supreme Court's ra-
tionale, and therefore, will demonstrate the applicability of CCNV
to all artists.
A. Case Analysis:
1. Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.90
In May, 1933, Walt Disney Productions, Inc. released the cartoon
film "The Three Little Pigs." Ann Ronell, appellant's predecessor in
interest, assisted with the film's soundtrack including the popular
song "Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?" 9 1 The Second Circuit
decided that this was a work made for hire on the basis that "the
motivating factor in producing the work was the employer who in-
duced the creation."92
Picture Music was decided prior to the enactment of the 1976
Act. If decided today under the recent Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the 1976 work made for hire provision, the result should be
different. The creator here would not fit within section 10 1(1) be-
cause the Supreme Court in CCNV defined "employee" using com-
mon law agency principles. 93 In Picture Music, the Second Circuit
explicitly labeled Ronell an independent contractor thereby disal-
lowing the creation to be a work for hire in the absence of an ex-
90. 457 F.2d 1213 (1972).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1216. The court reasoned that Disney "controlled the original song,
they took the initiative in engaging Ronell to adapt it, and they had the power to
accept, reject or modify the work." Id. at 1217. The court further stated that
although "she acted in the capacity of an independent contractor [this] does not
preclude that the song was done for hire." Id. at 1217.
93. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text (discussing the common law
agency principles discussed in CCNV).
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press agreement.9 ' Furthermore, there was no agreement
expressing anything to the contrary.9" Therefore, under the CCNV
rationale, Ronell would retain all copyright interest in her work.
Under section 101(2), in order for a work to be considered "for
hire," it would have to fit within one of the enumerated categories
and be the subject of an express agreement labeling it as such.9" In
Bourne, the song "Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?" clearly fits
into one of the categories since it was a contribution to the collec-
tive work, "The Three Little Pigs." There was no express written
agreement, recognizing that the work was "for hire." Therefore,
contrary to what the Second Circuit held in 1972, under the CCNV
analysis, Ronell retains the copyright interest in the song.
2. Bertolino v. Italian Line 97
In Bertolino, plaintiff (Mario Bertolino) entered into a recording
contract with Italian Line Records to produce sixty compositions,
perform concerts and to receive a 2.7% royalty rate on the retail
price of all records sold.98 In return, Italian Line was given the right
to supervise production of the recordings, and direct the net profits.
The contract explicitly stated that Italian Line retained all right, title
and interest in the recordings. 99
The district court held that where an agreement called for a
singer to devote his services exclusively to producing sixty record-
ings, and provided that "the producers would direct, underwrite,
and supervise production of the recordings, .. . the singer had no
copyright interest absent a contractual reservation." 10 0
The district court did not discuss whether Bertolino was an em-
ployee, because all copyright interest was explicitly granted to Ital-
ian Line as per the agreement. 10 1 In the absence of such, under the
CCNV rationale, Bertolino would probably be considered an em-
ployee in the traditional agency sense. Therefore, the copyright in-
terest would remain with Bertolino.
94. Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1217. Using the pre-1976 Act and pre-CCNV
rationale the court in Picture Music stated: "That she acted in the capacity of an
independent contractor does not preclude a finding that the song was done for
hire." Id.
95. See generally Picture Music, 457 F.2d 1213.
96. See supra note 23 (setting forth text of section 101(2)).
97. 414 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
98. Id. at 281.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 284. In Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369
F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966), the court stated: "[Tihere is a presumption in the absence
of an express contractual reservation to the contrary, that the copyright shall be in
the person at whose instance and expense the work is done." Id. at 567. In
Berfolino, no such contractual reservation existed. Bertolino, 414 F. Supp. at 284.
101. Id. at 281.
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This is true primarily because of the longevity of Bertolino's con-
tract with Italian Line. The opera singer was required to create over
sixty albums. Also, Italian Line retained a substantial degree of con-
trol over Bertolino, and under section 201(b),10 2 the organization
who commissions the work becomes the author and receives the au-
thor's copyright when the creation is a "work made for hire."
Suppose, however, Bertolino created only one album and the
agreement did not specify that the work was for hire. Then,
Bertolino would clearly retain copyright ownership unless the facts
indicated otherwise that he was an employee in the traditional sense
under section 101(1).103
3. Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software" 4
In Evans Newton, plaintiff (Evans Newton) wrote the system bid
guidelines with programming specifications for a school record-
keeping program including flow diagrams, numbering and coding
systems.' 08 In addition, he developed sample printouts and re-
ports. 0 6 While the Seventh Circuit cited no evidence that the de-
fendant (Chicago Systems) actually controlled the independent
programmer, it held that the evidence provided was sufficient to sat-
isfy the requirements of section 101(1), and therefore, that the de-
fendant was the statutory author on the theory that the work was for
hire. Thus, the work product of independent programmers was con-
sidered a work for hire.' 0 7 Ironically, at least one commentator
stated that there is a need for the Supreme Court or Congress to rule
on the copyright ownership of computer programs created by in-
dependent programmers.' 0 8
The Supreme Court resolved this problem in CCNV. If the Evans
Newton case were decided under the CCNV test, then the work
product of the independent programmers would not be considered
a work for hire under section 101(1) of the 1976 Act, since the
102. See supra note 21 (setting forth text of section 201(b) of the 1976 Act).
103. See supra note 23 (setting forth text of section 101(1)).
104. 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
105. Id. at 891.
106. Id.
107. In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit utilized the Aldon Ap-
proach. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Aldon Ap-
proach). Judge Harlington Wood stated in Evans Newton "[w]e find the Second
Circuit's analysis and conclusion [in Aldon] compelling." Evans Newton, 793 F.2d
at 894.
108. See Reece, Computer Law: The Work For Hire Doctrine - A Trap for the
Unwary Company, Nat'l L.J., April 3, 1989, at 40-41. Mr. Reece stated that "[u]ntil
the Supreme Court resolves the controversy or Congress provides a legislative so-
lution to the issue, the treatment of computer programs written by independent pro-
grammers is very much dependent on the jurisdiction in which the dispute arises."
Id.
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programmer was clearly independent, and not an employee in the
conventional sense.
B. Future Effects
1. What Contracting Parties Must do to Safeguard Their Interests
In summary, after CCNV, businesses that commission independent
creators cannot rely on a broad interpretation of the term "em-
ployee" in section 101(l) to acquire copyright ownership, as most
independent creators are likely not to be conventional employ-
ees.10 9 Instead, a hiring party must enter a written agreement with
the creator. 110 If the work fits into any one of the nine categories of
section 101(2) of the 1976 Act, the agreement must explicitly rec-
ognize that the work is made for hire."' 1 Alternatively, if the work
does not fit into any of these categories, the written agreement must
explicitly assign to the commissioning party the creator's ownership
of the copyright and his right to renew. 112
Employers in the entertainment industry, therefore, must make it a
practice to safeguard any copyright ownership they wish to retain.
For example, record companies who contract with independent re-
cording artists for single records should specify that a work is done
for hire.
Suppose an independent composer writes a song for the sound-
track of a film. Absent an express agreement, most courts would find
that under section 101(1) an employment relationship did not exist
and therefore the work would not be for hire and the artist would
retain all copyright interest. Furthermore, while the one track would
be a compilation to a collective work (the entire soundtrack), under
101 (2), the copyright ownership will remain with the composer un-
less an explicit agreement says otherwise.
Creative works which have already been created by independent
authors under an arrangement which did not provide in writing for
an assignment of copyright to the hiring party are likely to be found
to belong to the author. Businesses which plan to re-use such works,
including recorded music, photographs, and computer programs,
should not proceed on the assumption that they own the rights, and
should arrange to obtain the right of use. This might, however, re-
quire additional compensation, particularly if the commissioning
party does not have an ongoing relationship with the creator.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE ACTION IS NECESSARY AND
IMMINENT
The Supreme Court has outlined a test for courts to apply, but it is
not enough to resolve this long-standing conflict that has perplexed
courts for over a decade. The Supreme Court's rationale is valid for
most cases, but not if a conventional "employee" performs an act
unrelated to his conventional duties. The following hypothetical sit-
uations will illustrate this dilemma.
For example, Mr. Singer has been working for Fordham Record
Co., for ten years, and his contract states that he will write music
exclusively for Ms. Songstress on a work for hire basis, which he has
been doing. Suppose Mr. Singer now has written a song exclusively
for Ms. Topforty to be published by Fordham Records. Who owns
the copyright in Ms. Topforty's song? Fordham or Singer? Since
Mr. Singer is a conventional employee, it could be argued that the
copyright interest would probably lie with Fordham. However, ac-
cording to his agreement, the scope of his employment is to write
solely for Songstress with no mention of other work. It could be ar-
gued, under general agency principles, that Singer is acting outside
the scope of his employment, and therefore, he is not an "employee"
when he writes for Topforty and retains copyright interest in that
song. [Compare how it falls short under the CCNV Test].
Now suppose Singer is an independent writer under the same con-
tract who writes for Topforty at his leisure in his own home, and is
not supervised by Fordham at all. Singer would not be considered a
conventional employee, but an independent contractor. Further-
more, there is no explicit agreement designating the Topforty song
as a work for hire, because the contract states that the work is to be
done exclusively for Ms. Songstress.
Cases like these will blur the clear-cut distinction made by the
Supreme Court in CCNV. Consequently, Congress should resolve
this judicial dilemma by amending the 1976 Act.113 Granted, even
an amendment will not solve all the problems, but it is definitely a
step in the right direction.
Since 1982, Senator Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) has introduced pro-
posals to clarify the work made for hire definitions of "employee"
and "scope of employment" in favor of freelance artists. Shortly fol-
lowing the CCNV decision, Cochran introduced his latest work
made for hire bill, S.1253.1"
113. One commentator warns that the works made for hire dilemma is alive and
well even after CCNV. Goldberg, Copyright Law: Work For Hire Resolved?
N.Y.L.J., July 21, 1989 at 3, col. 1. Mr. Goldberg stated that "[n]otwithstanding the
Supreme Court's clarification of the work made for hire definition in the statute, the
battle between creators and users over this issue may not be over." Id. at 4, col. 5.
114. The bill was introduced to the Senate and referred to Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on June 22, 1989. Hearings began by Patents/Copyright Subcommittee on
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The bill proposes four changes for section 101 of the 1976 Act.
First and foremost, the bill makes it clear that sections 101(l) and
101(2) are mutually exclusive. Second, the bill explicitly defines
employee as "a formal salaried employee."' is This would solve the
hypothetical discussed above.
The third change deals with section 10 1(2), and it seeks to bar the
so-called "blanket" work for hire agreements by requiring agree-
ments to be entered into for each commissioned work.' 1 6
The fourth proposed change operates after the fact and would re-
quire the agreement to be signed before the commencement of the
work. "It seeks to counter the practice of stamping a work for hire
provision on the back of a check forwarded to the freelancer in pay-
ment for the commissioned work."' "1 7
Publishers, are opposed to the new bill stating that it would create
inflexibility in the statute."' Artists, however, feel that the amen,:-
ments are essential to protect the rights of all parties involved." 9
September 20, 1989 and are still pending. "Contending that the Supreme Court
used agency principles because it was unable to determine conclusively what Con-
gress intended 'employee' to mean, Senator Cochran... urges that his bill seeks to
fill that void and responds to a perceived invitation by the court for further legisla-
tive clarification." See Goldberg, supra note 112, at 4. See also S. Rep., 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. § 10345i July 24, 1990. At legislative hearings in
July of 1990, Senator Cochran discussed abuses of the work for hire doctrine. Sen-
ator Cochran stated that "one of those abuses is the practice of requiring a creator
to sign a blanket work for hire agreement, under which the creator surrenders...
his rights to a commissioned work." 136 Cong Rec. § 10345 (July 24, 1990).
115. S. Rm. No. 10345, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). See also S. Rin. No. 1253,
101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1989).
116. Id. A "blanket" work for hire agreement covers all creative works in gen-
eral and does not specifically itemize the works. Id.
117. Id.
118. Copyrights, Publishers Oppose Work-For-Hire Legislation at Senate Hear-
ing, The Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., Daily rep't for executives, Sept. 28, 1989, at
A-S. Publishers expressed their dissent with Senator Cochran's bill at a hearing
before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks on Sept.
20, 1989. Id. Particularly in opposition were Michael R. Klipper, of the Committee
for America's Copyright Community, and Victor A. Kovner of the National Publish-
ers of America. Id. Klipper stated that:
The bill... would make major changes in the Copyright Act's work for
hire definition... at a time when employers and commissioning parties are
assessing the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in CCNV v. Reid. It
would ignore the malleability in the current law with rigid, inflexible rules
that ignore the realities of the business world and the marketplace.
Id.
119. Id. Author Tom Clancy noted that writers are creators of ideas that receive
royalties based on how successful the ideas become. He further stated "publishers
gamble their money on the writers ideas but they retain the advantage of making
the rules under which the publishing business operates. The good of society comes
from protecting those who produce ideas ... not from protecting those who exploit
them." Id.
Nicholas A. Veliotes, of the Association of American Publishers, Inc., on the
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The proposed revisions in the 1976 Act are a necessary step en
route to clarifying the work made for hire doctrine, which has trou-
bled the courts for too long. The first two proposals of the Cochran
Bill are a codification of the CCNV decision by finally giving a clear
definition of "employee" and recognizing the explicit dichotomy
between sections 10 1(1) and 10 1(2). The proposed revisions also
seek to clarify any misunderstandings under 101(2) which were not
mentioned by the Supreme Court. The four amendments virtually
leave no room for error as they force parties to protect themselves
by explicitly stating what the agreement constitutes.' 20
CONCLUSION
The proposed changes in the recent Senate bill will definitely tidy
up many loose ends of the 1976 Copyright Act and will subse-
quently reduce litigation. While these alterations are both neces-
sary and imminent, however, they will solely effect future
agreements. Since the Constitution forbids the passing of ex post
facto laws, 12 1 there are still potentially numerous agreements made
other hand, feels that publishers and authors are not at odds. He stated that "we
have worked to improve the process by which rights are contractually established
and transferred .... Our system can continue to thrive, so long as its inherent
balances are left undisturbed." Id.
According to R. Jack Fishman of the National Newspaper Association, "[i]f the
paternity right were applied to newspapers, a publisher would have to determine
exactly who was the author of each piece.., a difficult task that would consume a
great deal of time." Id. He further stated that a "writer would retain the ability to
veto edits of their stories, which would create an unacceptable conflict between
reporters and editors." Id.
120. Additionally, the proposed Senate Bill seeks to clarify the definition of a
"Joint Work" under the 1976 Act. Id. Section 101 defines a "joint work" as "a
work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1976). In CCNV, the Court stated that although CCNV was not an employer
for hire, CCNV might be the "author" of a joint work. This issue was remanded to
the trial court. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 732. "CCNV nevertheless may be a joint author
of the sculpture . . .if, on remand, the District Court determines that the parties
prepared the work with the intention that their contributions be merged into insepa.
rable and interdependent parts of a unitary whole." Id. Based on the 1976 Act, the
district court will have to decide whether CCNV and Reid prepared the work with
the intention that "their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdepen-
dent parts of a unitary whole." Id. Thus, here we go round the interpretation
merry-go-round once again.
In anticipation of this, Senator Cochran's Bill amends the definition of a "joint
work" in favor of freelance creators. S. REP. No. 1253, 101st'Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990). It would require that each author of the joint work "contribute original or
copyrightable subject matter to the work." Id. See also Goldberg, supra note 113,
at 4. In addition, the amendment would require that in the case of a specially or-
dered work, the parties must designate that the work will be a "joint work" before
the commencement of the work. Id.
121. U.S. CowsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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under the guidance of the 1976 Act, that could be contested. These
prospective controversies, must confer with the analysis offered in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 122 After all, it is this
decision that has paved the way for prospective amendments to the
1976 Copyright Act.
In a desperate attempt to interpret the language of the work made
for hire doctrine, Circuit Courts begged the -Supreme Court for
assistance. The Court recently heeded to the call en route to a clari-
fication of an age-old doctrine. The decision must eventually lead
to the enactment of several legislative amendments, and together
they should put all interpretive controversies regarding employer/
employee relationships and works made for hire to rest, once and
for all.
Nicholas C. Katso2's
122. CCNV, 490 U.S. 730.
